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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                           
No. 08-1638
                           
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DEREK MCCLELLAN, Appellant
                           
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court  No. 2-06-cr-00263-001
District Judge: The Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.
                              
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
October 27, 2009
Before: SMITH, FISHER and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 30, 2009)
                             
OPINION
                             
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
In July of 2006, a federal grand jury sitting in the Western District of Pennsylvania
returned a three count indictment against Derek McClellan.  The first and second counts
charged McClellan with violations of  21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) by conspiring to
distribute and by possessing with the intent to distribute 500 or more grams of a mixture
1  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  § 1291.
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and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine.  Count three charged McClellan
with being a felon in possession of two firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
McClellan filed a motion to suppress evidence, challenging the validity of authorized
wiretaps and seeking a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), to
attack the existence of probable cause for the search warrant that had been executed at the
home of his girlfriend, Carla Hudson.  After the District Court denied McClellan’s
motion, he entered a conditional guilty plea to the conspiracy and firearm charges.  The
District Court sentenced McClellan to, inter alia, 120 months of incarceration on both
counts, to be served concurrently.  This timely appeal followed.   We will affirm the
judgment of the District Court.1
McClellan contends that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
He argues that the wiretaps were invalid because the  applications neither satisfied the
necessity requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) and (3)(c), nor established probable
cause as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(b).  In addition, McClellan submits that the
wiretap information should be suppressed because the warrant for the wiretaps was based
to some extent on evidence obtained from a pen register that was authorized by a judge
who lacked jurisdiction.  The motion to suppress also challenged whether the affidavit in
support of a search warrant for the premises at 808 Waddell Avenue had sufficient facts
to establish probable cause. 
In United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir. 2005), we noted that 18
3U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) requires that the application for a wiretap include a “showing of
necessity.”  This statement must explain “why ‘normal investigative techniques would be
of no avail.’” Id. at 180 (quoting United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1114 (3d Cir.
1985)).  We exercise plenary review in determining whether the application contained the
requisite statement of necessity.  United States v. Phillips, 959 F.2d 1187, 1189 (3d Cir.
1992).  Once it is determined that the statement of necessity was contained in the
application, we “review the court’s determination of necessity for an abuse of discretion.” 
Id.  
After reviewing the applications, we conclude that they contained the factual
predicate sufficient to inform the judge why other methods of investigation were
inadequate.  United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 345 (3d Cir. 1992).  We find no
abuse of discretion in determining that the wiretaps were warranted in light of the
affidavit’s explanation that certain investigative methods had failed or were unlikely to
succeed because of, inter alia, fears of violence and retribution. Phillips, 959 F.2d at 1190
(finding no abuse in grant of application for wiretap where the “use of an undercover
agent would have been too dangerous due to the close association of the conspiracy’s
members and because the area was a small community where everyone was acquainted
and outsiders would have been immediately suspect”).
McClellan also contends that the applications for the wiretaps were insufficient to
establish probable cause.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(b) (directing that the court must
determine that “there is probable cause for belief that particular communications
concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception”).  We exercise
4plenary review over a district court’s decision that “bases its probable cause ruling on
facts contained in an affidavit.”  United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1204 (3d Cir.
1993).  Our review of the initial probable cause determination, however, is deferential as
we scrutinize the affidavit to determine if “there is a substantial basis for a fair
probability” that the wiretaps would obtain communications regarding illegal drug
transactions.  Id. at 1205.  Here, the applications and the affidavits provided a sufficient
factual basis to conclude that the wiretaps satisfied this standard.
Some of the factual content in the affidavit was obtained from two pen registers:
one issued by the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas and the second issued
by the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.  McClellan argued before the District
Court that the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction to
authorize the pen register for Carla Hudson, the subscriber of the cellular telephone,
because she resided in Allegheny County.  He relied on the fact that 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
5773(a) provides that the “court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation
and use of a pen register . . . device within the jurisdiction of the court . . . .”   The District
Court rejected this argument, citing Commonwealth v. McPhail, 692 A.2d 139 (Pa. 1997)
(plurality), which reasoned that “the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts of common
pleas is not limited to the territory of the county wherein the court sits; rather, it is
statewide.”  Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066, 1073 (Pa. 2003) (discussing
McPhail’s plurality opinion).  McClellan argues that the District Court erred because
plurality opinions do not have precedential value and because any persuasiveness
McPhail possessed was eroded by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in
5Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66 (Pa. 2008).  Although the government does not
believe the District Court  erred, it cites the testimony of one of its agents, who explained
that the real time data from the wiretap was received at a facility located in Westmoreland
County. 
McClellan is correct that McPhail lacks precedential value in light of its status as a
plurality opinion.  Bethea, 828 A.2d at 1073.  Nonetheless, a majority of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Bethea held that “all courts of common pleas have statewide subject
matter jurisdiction in cases arising under the Crimes Code.”  Id. at 1074.  Accordingly, in
the event the receipt of real time data at the communications facility in Westmoreland
County was insufficient to establish jurisdiction, Bethea compels the conclusion that the
Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas had the requisite jurisdiction to authorize
the pen register for the cellular telephone subscribed to by Carla Hudson.  
McClellan also contends that the affidavit in support of the search warrant for the
residence at 808 Waddell Avenue contained false and misleading statements that must be
set aside pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and that without these
statements probable cause for the search was lacking.  We have carefully reviewed the
affidavit in support of the search warrant, as well as the transcript of the Franks portion of
the suppression hearing.  We conclude that McClellan failed to establish that the affiant
for the search warrant either knowingly and deliberately included a false statement in the
affidavit, or made a statement with reckless disregard for its truth.  The statements may
have been incomplete, but they were not misleading in light of all of the circumstances
alleged in the affidavit.  Because the facts set forth in the affidavit presented a substantial
2  McClellan correctly notes in his brief that if we uphold the electronic
surveillance and the search warrant, his contention that the warrantless forcible entry of
the premises at 808 Waddell Avenue lacks merit under Segura v. United States, 486 U.S.
796, 810 (1984).  
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basis for believing that evidence of illegal drug transactions would be found at the
premises, the District Court did not err by denying the motion to suppress the evidence
seized pursuant to the execution of the search warrant.2
